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Biometric Data Collection and RFID Tracking in Schools: A 
Reasoned Approach to Reasonable Expectations of Privacy* 
That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the 
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and 
teach youth to discount important principles of our government 
as mere platitudes.1 
INTRODUCTION 
At a time when many have decried the seemingly glacial pace at 
which this nation’s public schools have incorporated technology into 
their pedagogical practices,2 twenty-first century advances are 
revolutionizing other aspects of the educational experience. Among 
these changes, the collection and use of biometric information—
uniquely identifiable physical characteristics ranging from 
fingerprints, to palm prints, to iris or retina patterns3—have been 
implemented in more than one thousand school districts in forty 
states,4 with some of these schools also tracking students’ movements 
 
 *  © 2016 Stefan P. Schropp. 
 1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
 2. See, e.g., Darrell M. West & Joshua Bleiberg, Five Ways Teachers Can Use 
Technology to Help Students, BROOKINGS (May 7, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research
/opinions/2013/05/07-teachers-technology-students-education-west-bleiberg [http://perma.cc
/3DBH-N8AX] (“Technology has failed to transform our schools	.	.	.	.”); Ryan Lytle, Teacher 
Training Needed to Meet Technology Needs in Classrooms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Sept. 20, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/high-schools/articles
/2012/09/20/teacher-training-needed-to-meet-technology-needs-in-classrooms [http://perma
.cc/7CVM-BEZ4] (detailing a survey of “high school and college students, teachers, and 
parents in the United States, China, and Germany” finding that “82 percent [of respondents] 
across the globe also noted that technology needs to play a bigger role in classrooms”); Linda 
Starr, Encouraging Teacher Technology Use, EDUC. WORLD, http://www.educationworld
.com/a_tech/tech159.shtml (last updated Mar. 31, 2012) [http://perma.cc/VNP8-6WPR] 
(“Some teachers, experts say, still are reluctant to use technology, mostly because of a lack of 
time, a lack of resources, or a lack of confidence in their ability to use the available 
technology.”).  
 3. See infra Section I.A. 
 4. Jeffrey Stinson, As Florida Bans Use of Biometric IDs in Schools, Other States 
Scale Back on Big Brother, FLAGLERLIVE.COM (Nov. 2, 2014), http://flaglerlive.com/72393
/children-biometrics/ [http://perma.cc/Y53H-4K7A] (“Jay Fry, CEO of the biometric-in-
schools firm identiMetrics, said biometric identification is used in more than 1,000 school 
districts in 40 states from Alaska to Long Island, New York. West Virginia uses the 
technology in 70 percent of its 57 school districts	.	.	.	.”). But see id. (“Several states are 
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through microchips.5 The new technology promises increased 
efficiency and improved student outcomes on a range of daily 
activities in the life of a student with applications from the lunch line 
to the library and the school bus to the classroom.6 
But despite the technologies’ promise, these advances have not 
come without their fair share of detractors. A nascent body of 
scholarly work,7 a passionate and growing cluster of advocacy groups,8 
and a patchwork of legislative proposals9 have critically reviewed the 
security concerns and potential for malfeasance inherent in biometric 
data collection and radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) tracking. 
These critiques have ranged from the purely rhetorical10 to the 
perfectly well reasoned11 and have come from both ends of the 
traditional political spectrum.12 
 
now banning or restricting the use of the technology in schools, as worries over student 
privacy have risen amid breaches of government and commercial computer databases.”). 
 5. See infra Section I.A. 
 6. See infra Section III.C. 
 7. See, e.g., Nicole A. Ozer, Rights “Chipped” Away: RFID and Identification 
Documents, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶¶ 26–43 (2008) (section entitled “Insecure 
RFID Technology Interferes with Constitutional Rights”); Alexandra C. Hirsch, 
Comment, Schools: Where Fewer Rights Are Reasonable? Why the Reasonableness 
Standard Is Inappropriate to Measure the Use of RFID Tracking Devices on Students, 28 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 411–14 (2011). 
 8. See, e.g., AGAINST RFID IN SCHOOLS, http://rfidinschools.com (last updated Mar. 
17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8CC7-MUU6]; Paul Joseph Watson, Texas Students Revolt 
Against Mandatory RFID Tracking Chips, INFOWARS (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.infowars.com/texas-students-revolt-against-mandatory-rfid-tracking-chips/ 
[http://perma.cc/J2KK-HVD4]. 
 9. See infra Section IV.A. 
 10. Take, for example, the comments of Missouri State Senator Ed Emery who 
sponsored the legislation prohibiting the use of RFID tracking in schools and believes 
“[t]here’s a ‘Big Brother’ quality to this.” Jeffrey Stinson, States Backtrack on Student 
Tracking Technology, STATELINE (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/Research-
and-Analysis/Blogs/Stateline/2014/10/27/States-Backtrack-on-Student-Tracking-
Technology [http://perma.cc/98ZA-VVHT]. 
 11. See, e.g., id. (“[L]awmakers [should] focus on transparency so parents know how 
the technology is being used, what data is collected and what safeguards are in place to 
protect students’ privacy.”). 
 12. Opposition to this technology has come from Republicans like Missouri State 
Senator Ed Emery and Florida State Senator Dorothy Hukill, who both sponsored 
legislation limiting or prohibiting its use. See id; Act of May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-41, §	2, 2014 
Fla. Laws 798, 799 (codified at FLA. STAT. §	1002.222 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Spec. 
A Sess.)); Act of Sept. 10, 2014, 2014 Mo. Legis. Serv. 137, 137 (West) (codified at MO. 
REV. STAT. §	167.168 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Mo. Gen. Assemb. 2d Reg. Sess.)). It 
has also come from Democrats like former Rhode Island State Senator John Tassoni, who 
sponsored the legislation in his state to ban the use of RFID tracking in schools. See S.B. 
211, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2009); Claire Swedberg, Rhode Island Governor 
Vetoes Restrictions on RFID, RFID J. (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles
/view?5377 [http://perma.cc/7D7K-WDZ7]. 
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Given the developing nature of literature in this field to date, it is 
important to note at the outset exactly where this Recent 
Development fits—what it is and, more importantly, what it is not. It 
is not an Orwellian “parade of horribles,” imagining a world where 
“every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every 
movement scrutinized.”13 Nor is it an attempt to account for the more 
well-founded fears that, in a world where even the wealthiest 
multinational corporations are subject to data breaches,14 perhaps 
even well-intentioned (but admittedly underfunded) school districts 
are not the appropriate repositories for sensitive personal 
information. Each of these approaches grapples with the compelling 
concerns that are raised when this technology is not used as it was 
intended—when something goes wrong. 
This Recent Development seeks to address the different but 
equally important concern that is raised when this technology works 
exactly as it was intended—when it goes according to plan. In its 
intended and most benign form, this technology necessarily requires 
trade-offs between students’ privacy and school efficiency and 
security that threaten wolf-like encroachments on the Fourth 
Amendment cloaked in the sheep’s clothing of twenty-first century 
advancement. Accordingly, this Recent Development seeks to test 
the constitutional support for the widespread collection of public 
school students’ unique biometric information. Moreover, it provides 
a framework for state legislatures to evaluate these trade-offs and 
decide for themselves—and for their students—whether the gains are 
worth the cost. This Recent Development freely admits, as did the 
Supreme Court over a century ago, that such compromises “may 
be	.	.	.	the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form”15 
 
 13. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 5 (1949). 
 14. See, e.g., Rachel Abrams, Target Puts Data Breach Costs at $148 Million, and 
Forecasts Profit Drop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06
/business/target-puts-data-breach-costs-at-148-million.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/JTM5-
L9AK (dark archive)]; Jordan Robertson, Which Big Retailer Hasn’t Reported a Major 
Breach—Yet?, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 21, 2014, 7:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2014-10-21/which-big-retailer-hasn-t-reported-a-major-breach-yet- 
[http://perma.cc/C64D-U8FW]. 
 15. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). Indeed, the Court has often 
rebuked the slow erosion of privacy rights. See generally id. (“It is the duty of courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy 
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.”); Osborn v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“These examples and many 
others demonstrate an alarming trend whereby the privacy and dignity of our citizens is 
being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each step may 
be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a society 
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but ultimately concludes, as that Court acknowledged, that to do 
nothing risks the greater harm of allowing “illegitimate and 
unconstitutional practices [to] get their first footing in that way, 
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes 
of procedure.”16 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of 
the field of biometrics and RFID technology with emphasis on 
school-specific applications of the technology. Part II examines the 
Fourth Amendment issues raised by the proliferation of this 
technology in schools and details the case law that provides a 
foundation for analysis. Part III analyzes the competing interests 
under consideration in this context using the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment framework and attempts to balance the needs of the 
school with the interests of the student. Finally, Part IV details the 
legislative responses to this point and suggests a comprehensive plan 
to ameliorate the concerns while preserving the benefits of these 
programs. 
I.  BIOMETRICS 
Biometrics refers to the measurement of an individual’s unique 
physical characteristics and the matching of those characteristics 
against previously recorded information to determine a person’s 
identity.17 Biometric data collection “is the process whereby biometric 
measurements are collected and integrated into a computer system, 
which can then be used to automatically recognize a person.”18 
Biometric data collection and scanning can serve two different 
purposes.19 The first, known as identification, compares biometric 
information against all previously stored information and makes a 
“one-compared-to-many match.”20 In the education context, this 
function allows a computer to uniquely identify a student from a 
database containing data on every student in a population. The 
 
quite unlike any we have seen—a society in which government may intrude into the secret 
regions of man’s life at will.”). 
 16. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635. 
 17. See Anil Jain, Lin Hong & Sharath Pankanti, Biometric Identification, 43 COMM. 
ACM 91, 92 (2000); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Brave New Whorl, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 
1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1997/03/30/brave-new-whorl
/6e618930-9765-43a3-803c-94a589d266d0/ [https://perma.cc/D9CX-XPL9].  
 18. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the 
Concerns—Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 100 (1997). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id.; see also Rudy Ng, Note, Catching Up to Our Biometric Future: Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Rights and Biometric Identification Technology, 28 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 425, 428 (2006). 
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second, known as verification, compares the biometric information 
only to the stored information for the claimed identity and searches 
for a “one-to-one” match.21 A verification system can only confirm 
that students are who they claim to be but does not allow the system 
to identify a particular student against all students in a population. In 
addition to public schools, both private22 and other public-sector 
entities23 have begun widespread use of biometric collections and 
scanning.24 
While the types of biometric information available to law and 
immigration enforcement have expanded rapidly in recent years—and 
may one day present an issue for public schools—the collection of 
biometric information from students is more limited. Accordingly, 
this Recent Development is limited to the three primary biometric 
and tracking technologies currently available to schools: (1) 
fingerprint or palm scans; (2) iris scans; and (3) the use of RFID 
tracking. These methods of collection and their applications are 
discussed below. 
A. Fingerprint and Palm Scans 
Law enforcement has used fingerprints for identification since 
the early twentieth century, making fingerprints “the most common 
and widely accepted form of biometric identification.”25 However, in 
a recent push toward increased efficiency and security, schools across 
the country have turned to fingerprint scanners in both their lunch 
 
 21. See Woodward, supra note 18, at 100; see also Ng, supra note 20, at 428. 
 22. Although not the focus of this Recent Development, private organizations—from 
Disney theme parks to banks and credit card companies to private gyms—now use 
customers’ biometric identification. See Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 
IND. L.J. 1475, 1532 (2013). 
 23. While this Recent Development focuses specifically on the use of biometrics in 
public K–12 education, other examples of government use of biometrics include the 
Secure Communities program (requiring biometric database screening of anyone 
apprehended by state and local law enforcement), United States Visitor and Immigrant 
Status Indicator Technology (requiring fingerprint collection of all non-citizen visitors to 
the United States), and U.S. Passports and e-Passports programs (requiring a digital photo 
that is provided to a centralized facial recognition database). See id at 1531–33. 
 24. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 18, at 97–98, 98 n.6. 
 25. Ng, supra note 20, at 429; see also John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious 
Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 
70 (2002) (“While fingerprinting is probably the most common and widely known form of 
biometric identification, it is by no means the only example.”); Woodward, supra note 18, 
at 104. 
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lines26 and their libraries.27 Unlike traditional law enforcement 
techniques, which compare the unique ridge formations of the entire 
fingerprint,28 most school-based systems scan only a portion of a 
student’s fingerprint.29 According to the companies producing and 
promoting the technology, this reduces or eliminates the potential for 
duplication and identity theft.30 Similarly, many school districts have 
implemented palm scanners, which, rather than scanning the entire 
palm, evaluate “the unique squiggle of lines made by the veins inside 
the hand” and “convert[] the scanned veins to a numeric value that 
matches each student in a database.”31 While these systems prevent 
the duplication of fingerprint and palm scans and thereby reduce the 
risk of identity theft, they must also be able to match biometric 
information to an individual student using the one-to-many 
identification approach of biometrics. 
B. Iris Scans 
A second area of growth in biometric data collection of K–12 
students is the expanded use of iris scans—particularly on school 
buses.32 The iris is the colored portion of the eye, surrounding the 
pupil, that contains a number of structures that can be used to 
uniquely identify an individual.33 An image of the iris is captured 
using a high-resolution camera and then compared to previously 
recorded and stored images.34 Several companies35 have developed 
 
 26. See, e.g., School Cafeterias Trading Lunch Money for Fingerprint Scans, CBS CHI. 
(July 2, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/07/02/school-cafeterias-trading-
lunch-money-for-fingerprint-scans/ [http://perma.cc/4VYV-VT4W]. 
 27. See, e.g., Best Practices—Technology: This Minnesota High School Gives Fingerprint 
Scanning a Whorl, ESCHOOL NEWS (Sept. 1, 2000), http://www.eschoolnews.com/2000/09/01
/b-best-practices-b-technology-this-minnesota-high-school-gives-fingerprint-scanning-a-
whorl/ [http://perma.cc/SE33-JRP8]. 
 28. See, e.g., Ng, supra note 20, at 429. 
 29. School Cafeterias Trading Lunch Money for Fingerprint Scans, supra note 26. 
 30. Id.; see also The identiMetrics Finger Scanning ID System, IDENTIMETRICS, 
http://www.identimetrics.net/index.php/products/the-identimetric-finger-scanning-id-
system [https://perma.cc/E8MF-VTNY] (“Fingerprints cannot be recreated from the 
encrypted numerical templates. Student accounts cannot be compromised.”).  
 31. James L. Rosica, Biometrics May Be Banned in Florida Schools, but Flourish 
Elsewhere, TAMPA TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://tbo.com/news/politics/biometrics-may-be-
banned-in-florida-schools-but-flourish-elsewhere-20140309/ [http://perma.cc/354L-S2WC]. 
 32. See Laurie Segall & Erica Fink, Iris Scans Are the New School IDs, CNN MONEY 
(July 11, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/11/technology/security/iris-
scanning-school/ [https://perma.cc/K73G-67BL]. 
 33. Ng, supra note 20, at 431. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., BLINKSPOT, http://www.blinkspot.com [http://perma.cc/Z9MY-45Y8]; 
EYELOCK, http://eyelock.com/index.php/products/nano-nxt [http://perma.cc/GJ2M-ZYHP]. 
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iris scanners specifically for use on school buses.36 The technology 
allows a student to look into a scanner (resembling a pair of 
binoculars) and have his identity matched to those iris scans already 
in the system.37 Once the system finds a match, it notifies the student 
and the driver that the student is on the correct bus and allows 
parents and school administrators to track the location of the 
student.38 As with fingerprint and palm scans, advocates of the system 
note that the data is encrypted and converted to a numeric code to 
prevent identity theft.39 However, like all school-based biometric 
information, iris scans use a one-to-many matching system that would 
allow schools, which own the biometric data,40 to match an available 
iris image to the existing database. 
C. Radio Frequency Identification 
While it is not a biometric measurement in the traditional sense, 
the advent and expanded use of RFID tracking shares the unique 
identification and one-to-many matching capabilities of fingerprints 
and iris scans. Since RFID technology originally appeared during 
World War II, “significant improvements in functionality; decreases 
in both size and costs, especially in the last decade; and agreements 
on communication standards have combined to make the technology 
[newly] viable” for a variety of purposes.41 
RFID systems consist of three components: a microchip, a 
reader, and a database.42 In a school-based RFID system, schools may 
require students to carry the microchip (typically embedded in an ID 
badge or sewn into a backpack) with them at all times.43 The chip can 
communicate with readers in one of two ways.44 First, in a passive 
system, the microchip communicates with the reader only when 
 
 36. Segall & Fink, supra note 32 (explaining how Blinkspot and Eyelock’s technology 
can be used to track children when they board school buses). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. But see David Goldman, Hackers’ Next Target: Your Eyeballs, CNN MONEY 
(July 26, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/26/technology/iris-hacking/index
.htm?iid=EL [http://perma.cc/WMU8-CRB4] (noting that the susceptibility of fingerprint 
and iris scans to reverse-engineering poses a huge problem). 
 40. See Segall & Fink, supra note 32 (noting that “the companies themselves don’t 
collect any of the data—the schools	.	.	.	that use them own the data”). 
 41. DAVID C. WYLD, RFID: THE RIGHT FREQUENCY FOR GOVERNMENT 5 (2005), 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/RFIDReport.pdf [http://perma.cc
/ZE8F-AKNW]. 
 42. Margaret L. Lorenc, Comment, The Mark of the Beast: U.S. Government Use of 
RFID in Government-Issued Documents, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 583, 586 (2007). 
 43. See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 419. 
 44. Id. at 416. 
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prompted—such as when placing a card with an embedded microchip 
near a locked door or when passing by a reader placed in the 
hallway.45 Conversely, in an active system, the microchip is in constant 
communication with the reader and provides consistent and real-time 
information on the location of the student.46 Finally, in both versions 
a central database serves as a storage location for information that 
allows authorized computers to access information stored in the 
system.47 This information includes not only the location and 
movements of the RFID chip but also any stored information unique 
to the chip’s owner—including name, photo, and other biometric 
indicators (such as fingerprint, palm print, or iris scan information).48 
While both supporters and opponents of RFID use in schools 
continue to debate the security these systems provide from identity 
theft,49 the importance of these systems to this Recent Development 
is that they serve both functions of a biometric scanner: the one-to-
one verification—confirming that a student was where she claims to 
have been—and the one-to-many identification—determining which 
student was in a particular location at a given time. Notwithstanding 
the security and privacy concerns,50 several school districts—in states 
from Texas51 to New Jersey52 to California53—have moved forward 
 
 45. Id. at 415–16. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-551, INFORMATION 
SECURITY: RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 1, 4, 9 (2005). 
 48. See id. at 9 (noting that the “type of information housed in the database will vary 
by application” but can include “item identifier, description, manufacturer, movement of 
the item, and location”). 
 49. Compare Hirsch, supra note 7, at 411–12 (suggesting that to steal RFID information 
“all a determined delinquent must do is identify a target school experimenting with the new 
safety system, pull a car up outside the building, and wait”), with Jennifer Radcliffe, Tracking 
Devices in School Badges Raise Concerns, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 11, 2010, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/spring-news/article/Tracking-devices-in-school-badges-
raise-concerns-1716571.php [http://perma.cc/Y6RN-QMFS] (“It’s a very secure system [with] 
no data to confirm that there’s any	.	.	.	safety risks.”). 
 50. While the concern with data security and identity theft has been covered in this 
Section, the remainder of the Recent Development focuses exclusively on the Fourth 
Amendment privacy concerns raised by these systems. 
 51. See Radcliffe, supra note 49 (detailing the implementation of RFID tracking in 
two Houston-area school districts). 
 52. See Claire Swedberg, New Jersey Schools Adopt RFID to Secure Their Facilities, 
RFID J. (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?10971/ [http://perma.cc
/N2FJ-BNZB] (describing the implementation of RFID tracking systems in all of a New 
Jersey district’s schools and in twenty-one of the district’s buses). 
 53. See Letter from Nicole A. Ozer, Tech. & Civil Liberties Policy Dir., ACLU of N. 
Cal. & Lee Tien, Sr. Staff Att’y, Elec. Frontier Found., to Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. & Joe Valentine, Dir., Emp’t & Human 
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with the implementation of RFID tracking programs in their schools. 
While these security concerns deserve the continued discussion they 
are receiving, the next Part instead focuses on the constitutional 
issues raised by the implementation of these systems. 
II.  FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN THE SCHOOL CONTEXT 
Children, like adults, enjoy the protections afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment—incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment—from unreasonable governmental searches 
and seizures.54 However, unlike adults, those protections are modified 
in the school setting to reflect the responsibility of the school to 
safeguard and educate the nation’s youth.55 This Part looks briefly at 
the historical context of the Fourth Amendment before detailing the 
Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing its protections inside the 
schoolhouse doors. 
A. The Fourth Amendment Standard 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”56 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he	.	.	.	historical 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment	.	.	.	was to prevent the use of 
governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers, 
and his effects.”57 Indeed, even among the sacred protections 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, those afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment are arguably the most zealously guarded by the Court.58 
 
Servs. Dep’t (Sept. 14, 2010), https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/asset_upload
_file994_9490.pdf [http://perma.cc/3L48-L6LS] (detailing attempts to implement RFID 
tracking in California schools). 
 54. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 55. See infra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 57. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928). 
 58. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by 
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.”); see also Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth 
Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564 (1990) (noting that the 
“fourth amendment protection [is] the single most important characteristic which 
distinguishes a free society from a police state”). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004) (“When technology is new or in flux, and its use may have 
privacy implications far removed from property law, Fourth Amendment rules alone will 
tend not to provide adequate privacy protections.”). 
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Moreover, while the historical underpinnings of the Fourth 
Amendment point to a desire to prevent the reappearance of “the 
pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or ‘writs of 
assistance’ to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the 
Crown,” the Court has expanded its protections beyond those police 
actions and has instead imposed its restrictions on all governmental 
action.59 
B. The Fourth Amendment Goes to School 
For the better part of the last century, the notion that the Fourth 
Amendment, as incorporated against the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment,60 “protects the rights of students against 
encroachment by public school officials” has been, in the Supreme 
Court’s estimation, “indisputable.”61 Indeed, at one point it seemed as 
though the Court was willing to match the constitutional rights of 
children within the schoolhouse to those of citizens outside it: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, 
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of 
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, 
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill 
of Rights.62 
However, since that time, the Supreme Court has slowly eroded 
the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to students who cross 
the schoolhouse threshold. Despite repeated assurances that students 
do not “shed their constitutional rights	.	.	.	at the schoolhouse gate,”63 
the Court’s subsequent refinement has left students with Fourth 
Amendment rights that “are different in public schools than 
elsewhere” given that “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard 
the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”64 The 
 
 59. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)) (describing the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions as “upon the 
activities of sovereign authority”). 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 61. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334. 
 62. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 637 (1943)). 
 63. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Although Tinker 
considered First Amendment issues in the school context, the Court has adopted similar 
language in the context of school searches and seizures as well. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 334 (“Equally indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
the rights of students against encroachment by public school officials	.	.	.	.”). 
 64. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). 
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Court has likewise found the probable cause standard of 
reasonableness, as applied in the criminal context, to “be unsuited to 
determining the reasonableness of administrative searches where the 
[g]overnment seeks to prevent the development of hazardous 
conditions”65 and “unnecessary in the public school context because 
such requirements ‘would unduly interfere with the maintenance of 
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures that are needed.’	”66 
Therefore, it seems clear that the side of the Fourth Amendment’s 
balancing test weighted by the student’s legitimate expectation of 
privacy “is limited in a public school environment where the State is 
responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.”67 
In the context of school searches, to determine the constitutional 
reasonableness of a search the courts must “engage in a fact-specific 
‘balancing’ inquiry, under which the magnitude of the government’s 
need to conduct the search at issue is weighed against the nature of 
the invasion that the search entails.”68 Under this test, “[o]n one side 
of the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of 
privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need 
for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.”69 To aid 
in this fact-specific inquiry, the Supreme Court has developed a 
framework that instructs a reviewing court to “consider first the 
‘scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue,’ then the 
‘character of the intrusion that is complained of,’ and finally the 
‘nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue’ and the 
efficacy of the means employed for dealing with it.”70 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Fourth 
Amendment protections in schools—even applying the three-part 
framework described above—does precious little to illuminate the 
constitutional boundaries of biometric data collection and RFID 
tracking. In the Court’s two leading cases, plaintiffs challenged the 
random drug testing of student athletes and others participating in 
extracurricular activities.71 In both of those cases, the Court relied 
 
 65. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822, 828 (2002) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 
(1989)). 
 66. Id. at 828–29 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 653). 
 67. Id. at 830. 
 68. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 352 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337). 
 69. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)). 
 70. Id. at 352 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66 (1995)). 
 71. Earls, 536 U.S. at 822 (challenging a policy that “requires all middle and high 
school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any 
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heavily on the fact that the activities in question were voluntary to 
find that the students had a reduced expectation of privacy72—a 
conclusion that does little to help gauge a student’s privacy interest 
where, as in the case of biometric tracking, the activity is 
compulsory.73 Similarly, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,74 the Court 
considered whether an administrator could reasonably search a 
student’s bag upon suspicion that the student had been smoking 
cigarettes in the bathroom75—an analysis which sheds little light on 
systematic or ongoing searches and surveillance. A recent Supreme 
Court decision holding that the strip-search of a thirteen-year-old girl 
was too intrusive to be constitutionally permissible—even with 
reasonable suspicion—similarly provides very little guidance upon 
which to begin an analysis.76 
However, a growing body of lower-court jurisprudence provides 
the sketches of a boundary line to demarcate the legitimate interests 
of the student and the needs of the school as they relate to ongoing 
searches. For example, the Eighth Circuit recently held that random, 
suspicionless searches of a student’s person and possessions ran far 
afoul of constitutionally permitted activity.77 Despite noting that 
students have a lower expectation of privacy inside the schoolhouse, 
the court held that a “search of a child’s person	.	.	.	is undoubtedly a 
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.”78 While noting 
the generalized concerns expressed by the school district regarding 
the presence of weapons and drugs in its schools, the court poignantly 
noted that “[a]ll schools surely have an interest in minimizing the 
harm that the existence of weapons and controlled substances might 
visit upon a student population, but public schools have never been 
entitled to conduct random, full-scale searches	.	.	.	because of a mere 
 
extracurricular activity”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995) 
(challenging a program that “authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of students who 
participate in	.	.	.	school athletics programs”). 
 72. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 823 (“In any event, students who participate in competitive 
extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on 
their privacy as do athletes.”); Acton, 515 U.S. at 657 (“By choosing to ‘go out for the 
team,’ they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that 
imposed on students generally.”). 
 73. See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
 74. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 75. Id. at 347 (finding the “search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of 
marihuana dealing” to be reasonable). 
 76. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009). 
 77. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 78. Id. 
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apprehension.”79 Therefore, at least in the absence of particularized 
suspicion, the court was willing to find that ongoing and systematic 
searches were an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that random and 
suspicionless use of drug-sniffing dogs (something at least one other 
circuit has offered as an effective and minimally intrusive measure)80 
violates the Fourth Amendment.81 Despite noting the important—
potentially even compelling—government interest at stake, the court 
concluded that “[i]n the absence of a drug problem or crisis	.	.	.	the 
government’s important interest in deterring student drug use would 
not have been ‘placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized 
suspicion.’	”82 Importantly, despite another court holding that the use 
of dogs was minimally intrusive83—an argument that could be 
advanced by proponents of RFID tracking, fingerprinting, and iris 
scanning—the Ninth Circuit still required individualized suspicion 
prior to the search. 
C. The Intersection of Biometric Data and the Fourth Amendment 
Before balancing the students’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy with the government’s interest in conducting the search, the 
lingering question of whether the collection of biometric data and the 
use of RFID tracking constitute searches must first be addressed. 
While the Court has yet to consider the collection of biometric data 
or the use of RFID tracking in schools, several recent cases shed light 
on the struggle the Supreme Court is facing to match the “18th-
century guarantee against unreasonable searches”84 with twenty-first 
century technology. 
In one of the Court’s most recent85 technology-based Fourth 
Amendment cases, United States v. Jones,86 the Court considered the 
 
 79. Id. at 356. 
 80. See id. at 355 (“Indeed, dogs and magnetometers are often employed in 
conducting constitutionally reasonable large-scale ‘administrative’ searches precisely 
because they are minimally intrusive, and provide an effective means for adducing the 
requisite degree of individualized suspicion to conduct further, more intrusive searches.”). 
 81. B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 82. Id. at 1268 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997)). 
 83. See id. 
 84. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
 85. The Court more recently considered the warrantless search of an individual’s cell 
phone following a lawful arrest and unanimously concluded that, absent a warrant, such 
action was unconstitutional. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). That case is 
distinguishable from the situation under consideration here for a number of reasons—
most specifically that it was incident to a lawful arrest and did not represent a systematic 
or ongoing search of the kind being considered here. See id. 
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government’s use of Global Positioning System (“GPS”) tracking—a 
technology identical in function, if not scope, to RFID tracking—and 
held that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, 
constitutes a ‘search.’	”87 Indeed, although the Jones Court split on the 
test to be applied,88 Justice Sotomayor’s statement in concurrence 
agreed with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion that widespread and 
warrantless tracking of citizens’ movements is a search and an affront 
to a free society: 
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s 
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects 
of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS 
monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a 
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person 
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to 
track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”89 
In a third opinion, Justice Alito, concurring with the three 
remaining Justices of the Court’s liberal wing, noted that “[n]ew 
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the 
expense of privacy”90 but nonetheless concluded that the “lengthy 
monitoring” constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.91 
The Jones concurrences suggest that a majority of the Court would 
hold that extended, warrantless monitoring of citizens by GPS—
particularly where that tracking also works a physical invasion92—
violates the Fourth Amendment. The long-term tracking at issue in 
Jones parallels to the suspicionless tracking of students over an 
extended period of time. 
In the short period of time since Jones, lower courts have taken 
note of the fact that five Justices would hold the long-term tracking of 
 
 86. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 87. Id. at 949. 
 88. Although the majority tethered its decision to the physical trespass worked by the 
attachment of a tracking device to the defendant’s car, it also acknowledged that “[i]t may 
be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying 
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require 
us to answer that question.” Id. at 954. 
 89. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 
F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
 90. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 91. Id. at 964. 
 92. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government’s physical intrusion on 
Jones’ Jeep supplies a narrower basis for decision.”).  
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individuals to be unconstitutional under the reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy analysis.93 This suggests that, even if the mandated use of 
RFID chips does not constitute a physical invasion (a doubtful 
conclusion to be sure),94 the lower federal courts believe that a 
majority of the Justices could hold that this data collection method 
would violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Conversely, existing case law on the involuntary collection of 
biometric data in other contexts—including fingerprints, palm prints, 
and iris scans—does little to discern the boundaries of appropriate 
state actions in the public school context. The leading cases deal only 
with the collection of biometric information by police from those 
accused or suspected of crimes.95 Importantly, those cases have noted 
that fingerprinting constitutes a search “even though 
fingerprinting	.	.	.	represents a much less serious intrusion upon 
personal security than other types of searches and detentions.”96 
Perhaps the best that can be said in the way of guidance at this 
point is that if the Supreme Court views palm prints and iris scans as 
identical to fingerprints and if it would use the same standard inside a 
school’s walls that it uses outside of them, then collecting fingerprints, 
palm scans, and iris scans constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. That said, the Court’s jurisprudence strongly suggests 
that fingerprinting does constitute a search in the criminal context 
and there is no articulable reason why palm prints or iris scans would 
be meaningfully different from fingerprints. Therefore, it seems 
 
 93. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 347 (4th Cir. 2015) (“In two 
concurring opinions, five Justices confronted the Katz question and agreed that ‘longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.’	” (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring))), reh’g granted, 
624 F. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2014) 
(“Jones also shed some new light on the Supreme Court’s understanding of a ‘dragnet,’ 
suggesting that the twenty-eight days of GPS monitoring at issue in that 
case,	.	.	.	constituted a ‘dragnet’	.	.	.	.”).  
 94. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that the RFID microchip must 
be carried on a student’s person at all times). 
 95. See generally Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (holding fingerprint evidence 
inadmissible when obtained during an unconstitutional investigative detention); Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (same). But see Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Hughey, 780 
F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1985) (considering government fingerprinting as part of a voluntary 
licensing process). 
 96. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 814; cf. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013) 
(holding that a buccal swab on a person’s inner cheek to collect DNA is a Fourth 
Amendment search because “[v]irtually any ‘intrusio[n] into the human body[]’	.	.	.	will 
work an invasion of ‘cherished personal security that is subject to constitutional 
scrutiny,’	” and comparing the DNA swab to similar searches such as a breathalyzer test 
and the scraping of an arrestee’s fingernails (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 
(1973); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966))).  
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likely—although far from certain—that a court would consider the 
school actions under consideration in this Recent Development to 
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Whether that 
search is reasonable is the subject of the next Part. 
III.  THE INTEREST AND THE NEED 
Leaving aside the admittedly open question—at least in the 
public school context—of whether biometric data collection and 
RFID tracking constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
the question of whether it would be a reasonable one still remains. 
Answering this question necessarily “depends on the context within 
which a search takes place	.	.	.	[and] requires ‘balancing the need to 
search against the invasion which the search entails.’	”97 This Part 
details the Supreme Court’s three-part framework and considers: (1) 
the “scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue;” (2) the 
“character of the intrusion that is complained of;” and (3) the “nature 
and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue” considered in 
light of the efficacy of the means employed by the school in dealing 
with it.98 
A. The Scope of the Student’s Expectation of Privacy 
As threshold matters, “it would be ‘anomalous to say that the 
individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth 
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal 
behavior.’	”99 Second, “[i]n carrying out searches and other 
disciplinary functions	.	.	.	[public] school officials act as 
representatives of the State	.	.	.	and they cannot claim	.	.	.	immunity 
from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”100 Finally, while 
courts have been willing to curtail Fourth Amendment protections for 
prisoners, “it goes almost without saying that ‘[t]he prisoner and the 
schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the 
harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration.’	”101 Therefore, as 
a baseline at least three things can be said about a student’s legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the school building. Students can 
legitimately expect Fourth Amendment protections: (1) that apply 
 
 97. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)). 
 98. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 352 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–66 (1995)). 
 99. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)). 
 100. Id. at 336–37. 
 101. Id. at 338 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977)). 
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even if they are not suspected of a crime; (2) that apply even to 
searches by school administrators; and (3) that are at least greater 
than those afforded to prisoners.102 
As the Supreme Court has noted, an expectation of privacy must 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate, and not 
simply an unreasonable or illegitimate subjective expectation of 
privacy.103 Students, like adults, have a reasonable expectation that 
they will not be required to provide fingerprints or iris scans, much 
less have their movements tracked, as they go about their daily 
activities.104 It is no stretch to imagine a citizen declining an invitation 
to wear a GPS locator to transmit his location to the government or to 
report to the police station for fingerprinting and iris scanning. And 
yet, this is not only something we are asking our children to accept in 
our schools but something we are training them to accept as normal 
for the rest of their lives. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has already rejected as 
“severely flawed” the notion that students have no legitimate 
expectation of privacy given the high levels of supervision to which 
they are already subjected.105 It is no argument—at least from the 
Court’s perspective—to say that merely because an administrator can 
physically watch a student, he should be permitted to do so 
electronically; or that because a bus driver will recognize her riders, 
she should be able to do so with an iris scan; or that because a student 
already has a lunch number, the ones and zeroes of a palm scan are 
no different. Indeed, the Jones Court rejected such an argument in 
the context of GPS tracking, holding that even though traditional 
surveillance of an individual would have been constitutional, GPS 
tracking through a physical trespass exceeded permissible Fourth 
Amendment bounds.106 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
suggested that where “	‘[t]raditional surveillance’	.	.	.	is 
constitutionally permissible[,]	.	.	.	[i]t may be that achieving the same 
result through electronic means	.	.	.	is an unconstitutional invasion of 
privacy.”107 
Finally, this privacy expectation is heightened even more when 
the government mandates the activity. Although at least one court, 
 
 102. See supra note 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 103. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338. 
 104. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 105. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338. 
 106. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953–54 (2012). 
 107. Id. The Jones Court did not reach the question of whether the electronic 
surveillance at issue would have been constitutional absent the physical trespass. 
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outside the criminal context, has found that government-mandated 
fingerprinting does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections,108 that 
court tethered its decision to the determination that voluntary 
fingerprinting “is required only as a condition for obtaining or 
keeping a license to engage in a business that the state may license. It 
is, moreover, rationally related to the investigation of the 
qualifications of licensees.”109 
When the state requires school children to provide fingerprints, 
palm prints, or iris scans in order to attend school, the disclosure 
becomes no less compulsory than where the police detain a suspect 
for the purpose of fingerprinting and identification.110 And with such 
compelled state action comes the attendant Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny. Indeed, as early as 1918, all fifty states had enacted some 
form of compulsory school attendance law111 and courts have 
repeatedly noted the compulsory nature of school attendance.112 
Additionally, the overwhelming majority of school districts are 
federally required to provide school lunches113 and many states 
require school districts to provide transportation to students who live 
more than a certain distance from their school.114 At least one court 
has noted that, where attendance is mandatory, constitutional 
protections approaching those afforded in the criminal context are 
warranted: 
[B]ecause school attendance is compulsory, a student’s 
participation	.	.	.	is not voluntary in the same way that 
 
 108. Trade Waste Mgmt. Ass’n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The 
fingerprinting requirement in N.J.S.A. 13:1E–128b(2) is not involuntary in the fourth 
amendment sense.”).  
 109. Id. 
 110. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 
723–24 (1969).  
 111. MICHAEL S. KATZ, A HISTORY OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION LAWS 17 (1976), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED119389.pdf [http://perma.cc/FGH3-CDLT]. 
 112. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 
2004) (“But the search regime at issue here is imposed upon the entire student body, so 
the LRSD cannot reasonably claim that those subject to search have made a voluntary 
tradeoff of some of their privacy interests in exchange for a benefit or privilege.”). 
 113. In 2013, more than ninety-four percent of the nation’s schools participated in the 
National School Lunch Program. See Alexandra Sifferlin, Why Some Schools are Saying ‘No 
Thanks’ to the School-Lunch Program, TIME (Aug. 29, 2013), http://healthland.time.com
/2013/08/29/why-some-schools-are-saying-no-thanks-to-the-school-lunch-program/ 
[http://perma.cc/8K3D-TGWM]. Schools participating in the National School Lunch 
Program are required to “serve lunches that meet Federal requirements, and they must offer 
free or reduced price lunches to eligible children.” National School Lunch Program, U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/NSLPFactSheet.pdf [http://perma
.cc/3KH4-RVDE]. 
 114. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §	18A:39-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.). 
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participation in extracurricular activities is voluntary. [The 
school district] “cannot reasonably claim that those subject to 
search have made a voluntary tradeoff of some of their privacy 
interests in exchange for a benefit or privilege.”115 
As the court noted, it strains credulity to argue that, where the law 
requires students to attend school, the state’s conditioning that 
attendance on the submission of biometric information constitutes a 
voluntary choice in any sense of the word. The important distinction 
therefore becomes the voluntary or compulsory nature of the 
disclosure. 
B. The Character of the School’s Intrusion 
The second part of the Supreme Court’s framework requires a 
reviewing court to consider the character of the intrusion by 
biometric data collection. To be certain, the physical nature of the 
intrusion on the student is so minimal as to border on the nonexistent. 
That said, it is well accepted that “[v]irtually any ‘intrusion into the 
human body,’ will work an invasion of cherished personal security 
that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.”116 Thus while it is likely a 
search,117 the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that fingerprinting 
(and by extension palm printing) is among the least intrusive means 
of searching available in the government’s arsenal.118 And in a world 
where swabbing for DNA is considered to be unobtrusive,119 some 
rightly worry that the limited physical trespass of an iris scan may 
place it outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment.120 Likewise, 
 
 115. See Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1189–90 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(quoting Doe, 380 F.3d at 354). 
 116. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)) (internal citations 
omitted) (alterations omitted). 
 117. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 118. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985) (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U.S. 721, 727 (1969)) (“[F]ingerprinting	.	.	.	represents a much less serious intrusion upon 
personal security than other types of searches and detentions.”). 
 119. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)) 
(“[The swab] involves but a light touch on the inside of the cheek; and although it can be 
deemed a search within the body of the arrestee, it requires no ‘surgical intrusions beneath 
the skin.’ The fact than an intrusion is negligible is of central relevance to determining 
reasonableness, although it is still a search as the law defines that term.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 120. See, e.g., Sabrina A. Lochner, Comment, Saving Face: Regulating Law 
Enforcement’s Use of Mobile Facial Recognition Technology and Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 201, 217 (2013) (“Using its rationale in Jones, the Court could find that iris scans 
violate the Fourth Amendment’s minimum protection and constitute searches; however, 
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when schools mandate the use of a tracking device, they undoubtedly 
“encroach[] on a protected area,”121 but the character of the physical 
intrusion of the search is again so minimal as to approach the 
inconsequential. 
However, the Supreme Court has never limited its calculation of 
the character of a government intrusion to simply the physical effects 
felt by the citizens. Indeed Justice Sotomayor has aptly noted that 
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”122 If the suggestion that the 
erosion of privacy would work a tremendous and lasting change on 
the psyche of American students is hyperbolic, then it is hyperbole in 
good company—shared by Supreme Court Justices123 and legal 
scholars alike.124 As one scholar has aptly described the intrusion 
under consideration here: 
There is a very good chance that an erosion of privacy and the 
destruction of human values that go with privacy is a greater 
long-range danger than the behavior that would be detected 
and deterred by student searches. It would be highly desirable if 
the citizens of the United States who are now in school learn to 
value privacy, learn by the school’s example that the society 
respects it, and learn that the courts will protect it from invasion 
by governmental searches that violate fourth amendment 
principles.125  
It seems fair to say that however little the physical intrusion may be, it 
is at least counterbalanced by the psychological intrusion these 
programs would visit on students. 
The final characteristic of this intrusion is the fact that it may 
actually be larger than initially meets the eye. The possibility of 
function creep—in which “databases created for one discrete purpose, 
despite the initial promises of their creators, eventually take on new 
functions and purposes”126—potentially expands the scope of this 
 
the Court found the physical trespass in Jones important, and iris scans have no element of 
physical trespassing.”). 
 121. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). 
 122. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“This Court has recognized the vital relationship 
between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.”). 
 123. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 124. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 125. William Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 
59 IOWA L. REV. 739, 792 (1974). 
 126. Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s Proposition 69: A Dangerous 
Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 283 (2005). 
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intrusion well beyond the issues addressed to this point. Government 
databases in the United States have a long history of function creep.127 
Beginning with Social Security numbers—which were originally 
conceived for the sole purpose of implementing the Social Security 
system but soon became “the universal identifier that their creators 
claimed they would not be”128—an expanding list of government 
databases has succumbed to function creep.129 Indeed, “[e]ven 
fingerprinting, the dominant method of criminal identification in the 
twentieth century, was originally intended as a system of 
recordkeeping for civil, not criminal, purposes.”130 Moreover, in light 
of the USA PATRIOT Act’s131 permission for the government to use 
the databases of private entities,132 it is difficult to imagine a school 
official having the authority—let alone the will—to deny access to 
federal or state officials133 who would use the databases for law 
enforcement, immigration, or public health purposes.134 
  
 
 127. See id.; Rachel Cox, Comment, Unethical Intrusion: The Disproportionate Impact 
of Law Enforcement DNA Sampling on Minority Populations, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 155, 
169–70 (2015). 
 128. Simoncelli & Steinhardt, supra note 126, at 283. 
 129. See, e.g., id. (detailing the expanded use of DNA databanks beyond their original 
finite purpose); Linda Bartusiak, Comment, Plea Bargaining for DNA: Implications on the 
Right to Privacy, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1115, 1128–29 (2011) (same). 
 130. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 40, Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753 (Md. 2014) (No. 
14-885), 2015 WL 294800, at *40. 
 131. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 & 50 U.S.C.). 
 132. Id. §	215, 115 Stat. at 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §	1861 (2013)); 
Bartusiak, supra note 129, at 1129 (“In addition to the function creep occurring within 
government-maintained DNA databases, the Patriot Act of 2001 permitted the 
government greater access to datasets maintained by private entities.”). 
 133. As just one example, the Miller (or third-party) doctrine, “permits the 
government to obtain information from third parties, in certain circumstances, without the 
procedural hurdles that would otherwise present themselves if the information were 
sought directly from a suspect.” Robert H. Gruber, Commercial Drones and Privacy: Can 
We Trust States with “Drone Federalism”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (2015); see also 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.” (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1979))). 
 134. Recent research indicates that both iris scans and fingerprinting can reveal 
sensitive personal medical information including whether the individual is suffering from 
diabetes, arteriosclerosis, hypertension, AIDS, high blood pressure, Down syndrome, and 
Turner syndrome. See Woodward, supra note 18, at 115–16. 
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C. The Nature and Immediacy of the Concern and the Efficacy with 
Which It Is Addressed 
Certainly, much has changed since the Court first took “notice of 
the difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public schools today” 
while still concluding that “the situation is not so dire that students in 
the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy.”135 
However, much remains the same as well. Indeed, the Court’s 1985 
observation of the then-present state of the American schoolhouse 
continues to aptly describe the contemporary classroom: 
Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in 
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly 
forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become 
major social problems. Even in schools that	.	.	.	have been 
spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation 
of order and a proper educational environment requires close 
supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of 
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if 
undertaken by an adult. “Events calling for discipline are 
frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, 
effective action.”136 
But even with that acknowledgement, courts have struck down school 
practices: (1) where “generalized concerns about the existence of 
weapons and drugs” led to subjecting “secondary public school 
students to random, suspicionless searches of their persons and 
belongings by school officials;”137 (2) where the school conducted 
searches using drug sniffing dogs but the record did “not disclose that 
there was any drug crisis or even a drug problem;”138 and (3) even 
where pat-down searches would have effectively combated 
demonstrated “concerns about drugs, alcohol, weapons, and 
distracting contraband.”139 
While there is no record to consider in the case of biometric 
information and RFID tracking, school administrators who have 
implemented these systems have given us something in the way of 
 
 135. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985). 
 136. Id. at 339–40 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)). 
 137. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 439, 451, 456 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 138. B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1268–69 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding 
the practice unreasonable but ultimately dismissing the plaintiff’s claims on the basis of 
qualified immunity). 
 139. Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1194, 1200 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(granting a request for a temporary restraining order on the grounds that a suspicionless 
search was likely unreasonable). 
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identifying the government’s interest. Proponents of palm scans in 
lunch lines in Florida have noted that the government interest is 
“moving lunch lines faster and giving students more time to eat.”140 
Those pushing iris-scanning technology on buses correctly point out 
that it will allow parents to track their students in real time.141 When it 
comes to RFID, school officials celebrate that “if a fight or injury has 
occurred, or if a parent is concerned that a child might not be in 
class	.	.	.	the software can be used to indicate where that individual 
was and when [and] may also eliminate the need for teachers to take 
attendance at the beginning of each class.”142 Additionally, almost 
every accounting of the need for RFID tracking makes reference to 
the desire to prevent tragedies involving school shootings.143 
But with the exception of preventing school shootings,144 these 
proffered governmental needs barely scratch the surface of 
important—to say nothing of compelling or immediate. Surely the 
need to move lunch lines quickly is a less important governmental 
interest than, say, the generalized concerns about drugs and weapons 
expressed by the school district in Doe, where the Court was 
unwilling to sacrifice Fourth Amendment protections.145 Surely if 
parents need to know the location of their children, technology has 
given them the ability to do so.146 And surely attendance is not so 
onerous or immediate a concern as to warrant the monitoring of 
students’ every move. Even more striking, when school 
administrators extol the ability to determine who was present during 
a fight using RFID, they breathe new life into the fear that function 
creep—taking a system designed for safety and attendance and using 
it for crime solving—may become the new reality. 
Finally, the goal of preventing school tragedies, while admirable, 
fails as a legitimate justification for expanded biometric technology 
use for an entirely different reason—namely, it is inadequate. As the 
Court has noted, the final Fourth Amendment consideration is not 
 
 140. Rosica, supra note 31. 
 141. See Segall & Fink, supra note 32. 
 142. Swedberg, supra note 52. 
 143. See, e.g., id. (“The use of RFID, cameras with built-in analytic software, and a new 
phone system—as well as the posting of armed officers and a new director of security—is 
intended to prevent tragedies like the December 2012 shooting in Newtown, Ct.”). 
 144. This explanation is inadequate for other reasons. See infra notes 147–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 145. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 355–56 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 146. See, e.g., Lori Grisham, Teen Tracking Apps: Good Parenting or Risky?, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/personal/2014/09/17/teens-
parents-tracking-apps-security-mamabear-teensafe/15716335/ [http://perma.cc/8SHF-SU55] 
(noting that one parental tracking app has at least 500,000 users). 
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only the “nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at 
issue”147 but also the efficacy of the means employed for dealing with 
it.148 There can be no doubt that preventing school tragedies is an 
immediate government concern, but the connection between the 
concern and the proposed remedy is tenuous at best.149 Setting aside 
school shootings that were perpetrated by non-students150 and those 
that were committed by teachers,151 the protections afforded by 
biometric tracking on this front are insufficiently effective to justify 
the invasion of privacy. Schools have other means to protect students 
during a shooting that do not threaten constitutional rights. For 
example, schools can equip their doors to lock down in the event of 
an emergency,152 and teachers and administrators can carry access 
cards. Absent demonstrable evidence that biometric and RFID 
tracking would prevent or limit school tragedies, the routine 
invocation of recent tragedies is a base appeal to every parent’s 
greatest fear—but it is not a constitutionally sufficient justification. 
When considering the entirety of the proffered explanations 
regarding the need for biometric scanning and RFID tracking, the 
school’s concerns and the efficacy of these measures in dealing with 
them leave much to be desired. 
D. The Final Balancing Act 
In the end, what this analysis is left with may be, as Justice Scalia 
once put it, the question of “whether a particular line is longer than a 
 
 147. As the previous paragraph notes, many of the concerns used to justify the 
implementation of biometric and RFID tracking systems are neither compelling nor 
immediate. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.  
 148. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995). 
 149. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGISTS, RESEARCH ON SCHOOL SECURITY: 
THE IMPACT OF SECURITY MEASURES ON STUDENTS 1 (2013), http://www.nasponline.org
/assets/documents/Research%20and%20Policy/Advocacy%20Resources/schoolsecurity.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/88W5-ZVUE].  
 150. See, e.g., Pete Williams, Authorities ID Gunman Who Killed 27 in Elementary 
Massacre, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/14
/15911025-authorities-id-gunman-who-killed-27-in-elementary-school-massacre?lite 
[http://perma.cc/R8VP-P74P]. 
 151. See, e.g., Jim Schoettler, Episcopal School Head Dale Regan Killed by Fired Teacher, 
Who Then Kills Himself, FLA. TIMES UNION (Mar. 6, 2012), http://jacksonville.com/news
/crime/2012-03-06/story/episcopal-school-head-dale-regan-killed-fired-teacher-who-then-kills 
[http://perma.cc/3MRU-YBHT]. 
 152. See, e.g., Emergency Automatic Gun Shot Lockdown System, SECURITY USA, 
http://securityusa.net/easl.html [http://perma.cc/G4LM-LFHV] (“The Emergency Automatic 
School Lockdown System, or EASL, is a system that has an automated capability to 
simultaneously lock down any and all doors in a school upon detection of a gunshot	.	.	.	.”). 
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particular rock is heavy.”153 On the one hand there is the student’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy not to be fingerprinted, palm 
printed, scanned, and tracked while going about government-
mandated business. While the standard for children in schools is 
admittedly lower, there can be little doubt that the ordinary 
American adult would find this intrusion to be unreasonable. This, 
coupled with the clear message to American schoolchildren that such 
surveillance is not only commonplace but also constitutional, and the 
potential for governmental function creep,154 leaves a hurdle for the 
government to clear in demonstrating a legitimate need—even inside 
the reduced constitutional confines of the public school system. 
On the other hand rests the school’s need to safely educate and 
feed the children entrusted to its care, the administrative ease 
biometric systems promise, the effective discipline they deliver, and 
the ever-present and well-founded fear that tragedy might befall the 
school. Even with the scales tipped in favor of the schools, the 
question of how the courts will measure these two competing interests 
remains an open one. While awaiting that clarity, however, the 
balancing act described in this Recent Development should allow 
legislatures to evaluate the tradeoffs inherent in these systems and 
decide for themselves whether the tradeoffs are worth it. 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
While the first portion of this Recent Development has grappled 
with the tougher—and perhaps unknowable—question of how the 
Supreme Court would balance the competing interests under a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to biometric and RFID tracking in schools, the 
remainder will focus on the simpler question of what can be done 
while awaiting that answer. Perhaps not surprisingly, many states 
have decided that the tradeoff—at least in its current form—is not 
worth it. In 2014 alone, thirty-six different states considered 110 
separate pieces of legislation confronting “the collection and security 
of student data.”155 Of those bills, at least thirty-nine—including 
 
 153. Bendiz Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
 154. Not to mention theft, which this Recent Development has largely sidestepped. See 
supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Stinson, supra note 10; State Student Data Privacy Legislation: What Happened in 
2014, and What Is Next?, DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN (Aug. 2014), http://dataqualitycampaign
.org/files/DQC%20Data%20Privacy%20whats%20next%20Sept22.pdf [http://perma.cc
/KKU3-EUN4]. 
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fourteen that eventually became law—addressed biometric data.156 
This Part provides an overview of the current legislative landscape 
and presents recommendations for other states to consider moving 
forward. 
A. Current Legislation 
Among the growing number of state legislatures concerned 
about the issue, Florida recently became the first state to implement a 
ban on the collection of its students’ biometric data.157 The legislation 
prohibits schools and districts from collecting, obtaining, or retaining 
any biometric information—specifically fingerprints, hand scans, and 
retina or iris scans.158 Florida is not alone in considering a blanket 
prohibition on the collection of this information. Indeed, legislation 
that recently passed the New Hampshire General Court bars the state 
from collecting biometric information—as well as twenty-one other 
categories of information—from students for any reason.159 The 
Maryland Senate has also proposed legislation to ban the collection of 
students’ biometric information.160 The bill unanimously passed the 
Maryland Senate161 before receiving an unfavorable report from a 
House committee162 after the school district at issue voluntarily 
stopped collecting biometric information.163 
Several other states have proposed or enacted legislation that 
would require notice and consent prior to the collection of any 
biometric information. Among these states, Illinois,164 Louisiana,165 
 
 156. See Stinson, supra note 10; 2014 Student Data Privacy Bills, DATA QUALITY 
CAMPAIGN (Aug. 27, 2014), http://dataqualitycampaign.org/files/Privacy%20Legislation
_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/5GRD-KLDA]. 
 157. Act of May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-41, §	2, 2014 Fla. Sess. Laws 798, 799 (West, codified 
at FLA. STAT. §	1002.222 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. & Spec. A Sess.)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Act. of May 27, 2014, ch. 68, §	189.68(I), 2014 N.H. Laws 71, 73 (codified at N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §	189.68(I) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)). 
 160. S.B. 855, 2013 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
 161. See GAM—Senate Vote Record 0648—2013 Regular Session, GEN. ASSEMBLY 
MD., http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmMain.aspx?pid=flrvotepage&tab=subject3
&id=SB0855,s-0648&stab=02&ys=2013rs [http://perma.cc/HB64-BQLK]. 
 162. See Md. H. Ways & Means Comm., 2013 Session, Voting Record: On the Motion 
to Substitute Bill for Unfavorable Report to S.	855 (Apr. 5, 2013), http://mgaleg.maryland
.gov/2013RS/votes_comm/sb0855_w&m.pdf [http://perma.cc/MM9L-T7A5]. 
 163. See Adam Vrankulj, Senate Bill Could Ban Biometric Data Collection from School 
Children in Maryland, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.biometricupdate
.com/201303/senate-bill-could-ban-biometric-data-collection-from-school-children-in-
maryland [http://perma.cc/FCH6-97N7]. 
 164. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-18.34(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.) (applying to cities of over 500,000 inhabitants). 
 165. LA. STAT. ANN. §	17:100.8(B)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
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and Arizona166 all require a parent or guardian to provide written 
permission—with Arizona requiring permission thirty days in 
advance—before any biometric data can be collected. Legislation 
currently pending or proposed in New York167 and Wisconsin168 
contains permission requirements as well. 
Additionally, state legislatures across the country have recently 
set their sights on the use of RFID technology to track students. 
At the same time New Hampshire banned the collection of 
biometric information,169 state lawmakers also largely banned the 
use of RFID tracking in schools.170 Missouri lawmakers felt so 
strongly about the issue that they overrode a veto effort by the 
state’s governor in enacting their own ban.171 These legislative 
moves follow on the heels of a complete ban of the use of RFID 
tracking in Rhode Island schools172 (also enacted over the 
governor’s veto)173 and the enactment of a notification and opt-
out requirement in Oregon.174 
B. Recommendations 
As technology evolves, state legislatures have a responsibility to 
remain abreast of these developments and implement protections 
 
 166. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §	15-109 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. & First 
Spec. Sess.). 
 167. S.B. 3119, 2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013). 
 168. H.B. 616, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014). 
 169. Act of May 27, 2014, ch. 68, §	189.68(I), 2014 N.H. Laws 71, 73 (codified at N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §	189.68(I) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)). 
 170. Act of May 27, 2014, ch. 68, §	189.68(II), 2014 N.H. Laws 71, 73 (codified at N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §	189.68(II) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)). (“No school shall 
require a student to use an identification device that uses radio frequency identification, or 
similar technology, to identify the student, transmit information regarding the student, or 
monitor or track the student without approval of the school board, after a public hearing, 
and without the written consent of a parent of legal guardian of an affected student which 
may be withheld without consequence.”). 
 171. Act of Sept. 10, 2014, 2014 Mo. Legis. Serv. 137, 137 (West) (codified at MO. REV. 
STAT. §	167.168 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Mo. Gen. Assemb. 2nd Reg. Sess.)); see also 
Missouri Bans Tracking RFID in Schools, AGAINST RFID IN SCHOOLS (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://rfidinschools.com/2014/09/15/missouri-bans-tracking-rfid-in-schools/ [http://perma.cc
/C6ZL-9YG2] (“The bill will take effect in October after lawmakers overrode Gov. Jay 
Nixon’s veto of the bill this past week, just barely getting the required two-thirds majority in 
both chambers.”). 
 172. Act of Jan. 5, 2010, ch. 153, §	42-153-1, 2009 R.I. Pub. Laws 1696, 1696 (codified as 
amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS §	42-153-1 (LEXIS through 2015 Sess.)). 
 173. The reasons given for vetoing the legislation stemmed largely from concerns over 
school shootings and RFID’s ability to prevent such tragedies as well as “the potential 
value of RFID for students with special needs.” Swedberg, supra note 12. 
 174. Act of June 18, 2013, ch. 427(1), §	1, 2013 Or. Laws 1182, 1182 (codified at OR. 
REV. STAT. §	339.890) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)). 
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commensurate with the challenges they present. To that end, this 
Recent Development recommends the following policy changes to 
protect student privacy rights: (1) student and parent notification and 
permission prior to beginning any collection or tracking; (2) the 
discontinuation of any collection or use of data and the destruction of 
any previously recorded information upon a student’s withdrawal 
from the school or district; and (3) a prohibition on the use or 
disclosure of any information obtained for these programs beyond 
what is expressly provided for in the initial notification. Each of these 
proposals is discussed in turn and, using Illinois’s student privacy 
statute as a model, language is suggested for each of the proposals 
under consideration. 
At a bare minimum, states should require that schools provide 
parents and students with adequate notification about these data 
collection programs and grant an opportunity to opt out of them if 
they choose. In this regard, recent Oregon legislation serves as an 
exemplar; it requires the Oregon Board of Education to develop 
regulations that, at a minimum, “[r]equire notification to students and 
parents about the use of radio frequency identification devices” and 
“[a]llow a student or a parent of a student to choose not to have the 
student wear, carry or use an item with a radio frequency 
identification device.”175 Although the Oregon legislation targets only 
the use of RFID devices, the language could easily be expanded to 
include biometric data collection as well. 
While allowing students and parents to opt out of these programs 
is the bare minimum that this Recent Development recommends, the 
preferable option would be to require parents to opt in—essentially 
requiring an affirmative act prior to enrolling a student in these 
programs. On this front, legislation in Illinois serves as an effective 
model by requiring “[w]ritten permission from the individual who has 
legal custody of the student	.	.	.	or from the student if he or she has 
reached the age of 18.”176 The distinction between allowing a student 
to opt out of these programs and requiring them to opt in may seem 
insignificant, but the importance of the privacy interests at stake 
suggests that the burden should be on the school rather than the 
student. 
Second, in order to prevent the continued collection of biometric 
information and to limit the possibility of function creep, state 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-18.34(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.). 
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legislatures should require all schools to discontinue the use of a 
student’s biometric information as soon as that student leaves the 
school. Again, Illinois provides an excellent model for this potential 
legislation because the state’s statute provides for the 
“discontinuation of use of a student’s biometric information	.	.	.	upon 
the student’s graduation or withdrawal from the school district.”177 
New legislation should also require school districts to destroy any 
previously recorded biometric or RFID tracking information as soon 
as the student leaves the school or school district. Not only will this 
reduce the potential for, and damage caused by, identity theft178 but it 
will also limit the ability of the information to be used outside of its 
original purpose.179 Illinois’s statute, which requires “[t]he destruction 
of all of a student’s biometric information within 30 days after the use 
of the biometric information is discontinued,”180 strikes the 
appropriate balance in ensuring that no student data are maintained 
beyond its useful life while still allowing a school adequate time to 
comply with the requirement. 
Finally, legislation should be enacted to explicitly limit the scope 
of the use of this information to the purposes for which it was 
originally intended. Illinois has enacted a statutory provision that 
minimizes—although does not eliminate—the potential for function 
creep that threatens to expand the use of students’ biometric 
information beyond its intended purposes by providing for a 
“prohibition on the sale, lease, or other disclosure of biometric 
information to	.	.	.	another person or entity, unless the disclosure is 
required by a court order.”181 While this provision does not preclude 
the possibility that biometric information could be used by police or 
other government agencies to identify a student in a one-to-many 
matching situation, it does require that a court at least consider the 
constitutional issues and would add clarity to the Fourth Amendment 
considerations by formalizing the “search” as it relates to the student. 
In concluding these recommendations, it is important to 
recognize one limitation of the model language above and to discuss 
 
 177. 5/34-18.34(b)(2). 
 178. This will limit the amount of information that could be garnered from any single 
theft. 
 179. This will prevent the development of Justice Scalia’s much-feared “genetic 
panopticon.” Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the 
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their 
mouths for royal inspection.”). 
 180. 5/34-18.34(b)(3) (2009). 
 181. 5/34-18.34(b)(5) (2009). 
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one proposal not adopted by this Recent Development. The examples 
discussed above are limited by the fact that none of the available 
legislation comprehensively addresses both the collection of biometric 
information and the use of RFID tracking technology. Any 
comprehensive piece of student privacy legislation must address both 
of these concerns. Whether a court will view RFID tracking as 
biometric data collection remains an open question and the issue is 
far too serious to be left susceptible to statutory interpretation. 
Secondly, this Recent Development does not advocate for a blanket 
prohibition on the use of biometrics and RFID in schools. The 
advances identified by school leaders and other proponents of 
biometric data deserve the praise they receive for streamlining 
administrative processes and helping schools focus on the task of 
educating the youth. Moreover, requiring students to give their 
permission serves the valuable purpose of informing students of their 
constitutional rights. 
State legislatures—and perhaps in their absence, local school 
boards—have a number of avenues available to better protect their 
students. Some states have not even scratched the surface of this issue 
while others have perhaps gone too far. Among the states that have 
addressed the issue with a reasoned approach, Illinois has taken many 
of the important first steps and could serve as an effective guide. 
However, the failure to consider these issues comprehensively 
threatens to undermine the protections that they have afforded to 
students and risks confronting new issues as technology continues to 
develop. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most that can be said for certain is that the issue of 
technology in our schools is not likely to fade in the near future. With 
each technological advancement, courts and legislators will face the 
unenviable task of discerning new boundaries for old protections. 
While the collection of biometric data and the use of RFID tracking 
likely constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the 
legitimate privacy expectations of students, the nature of the 
intrusion, and the needs of the school will remain as malleable and 
ever-changing as the technology itself. Reasonable courts can—and 
likely will—disagree about the appropriate bounds of the school’s 
authority over the students charged to its care. 
In the meantime, the duty rests on the legislature to give this 
issue the consideration it rightly deserves. This is not a time for 
inflammatory rhetoric and technophobic reactions. But neither is it 
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the time for passivity—for “silent approaches and slight deviations 
from legal modes of procedure” that would allow “illegitimate and 
unconstitutional practices [to] get their first footing.”182 If this 
deviation is to be accepted and legitimized, it should be done in the 
open and with informed debate. If it is not, then it is too important to 
leave unaddressed. 
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